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In Search of the Role of the Private Producer in 
the Argentine Petroleum Industry 
Nowhere can the vicissitudes of business life be experienced 
more acutely than in the private sector of the petroleum indus- 
try of the Argentine Republic. The discovery of oil in Argentina 
in 1907 precipitated an internal economic and political struggle 
to develop a national oil policy that has continued to this day.' 
On one side are the extreme economic nationalists who assert 
that state ownership of all minerals and state monopoly of the 
petroleum sector are fundamental to Argentina's industrial de- 
velopment and economic self-sufficiency. On the other side are 
the aristocratic economic liberalists who thrive on an export- 
based economy, support high importation levels, and encourage 
local foreign investment. Playing the middle of the field are the 
less radical economic nationalists who maintain that the state 
should be involved in energy production, but that private invest- 
ment and enterprise, under close scrutiny, should be allowed to 
supplement government  effort^.^ Historically, changes in govern- 
mental control among these forces have resulted in dramatic pe- 
troleum policy changes, usually in the form of executive decrees. 
federal intervenors, or new legi~lation.~ 
For the present time, it is clear the Yacimientos Petroliferos 
Fiscales (YPF), the official Argentinian state petroleum enter- 
1. C SOLBERG, OIL AND NATIONALISM IN ARGENTINA-A HISTORY 9 (1979); South 
America Cash Troubles Cloud Preurous Projections-Argentrna, WORLD OIL, Aug. 15, 
1982, at  124 (major revisions in Argentina's petroleum legislation are probable) [herein- 
after cited as WORLD OIL]. 
2. See C SOLBERG, supra note 1, a t  1-7, 13-14, 34-37, 82-86, 116-29, 176-79; UNITED 
NATIONS CENTRE FOR NATURAL RESOURCES, ENERGY, AND TRANSPORTATION, STATE PETRO- 
LEUM ENTERPR~SES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 12 (1980) [hereinafter cited as CNRET]. 
3. See, e.g , Decree No. 744163, Buenos Aires, Argen., Nov. 15, 1963 (annulling oil 
production controls), reprrnted in PETROLEUM LEGISLATION CO, SOUTH AMERICA-BASIC 
OIL LAWS AND CONCESSION CONTRACTS (ORIGINAL TEXTS) A-1 (Supp. IV 1964). The basic 
hydrocarbons laws now in effect were instituted in 1967 under President Ongania. See 
Memorandum from Minister Krieger Vassena and Secretary Gottelli to President On- 
gania (June 23, 1967) (submitting Hydrocarbons Law 17,319), repr~nted In PETROLEUM 
LEGISLATION CO, SOUTH AMERICA-BASIC OIL LAWS AND CONCESSION CONTRACTS {ORIGI- 
NAL TEXTS) B-1, B-24 (Supp. XV 1967) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum of June 23, 
19671; ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, GENERAL SECRETARIAT, MINING AFD PETRO- 
LEUM LEGISLATION I  LATIN AMERICA ND THE CARIBBEAN 19 (1980). President Ongania 
assumed his executive role in 1966. 
404 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I984 
prise, is not, by itself, capable of satisfying Argentina's drive for 
energy self-suffi~iency.~ Although YPF has served as a forerun- 
ner and model for state petroleum enterprises in Latin America, 
labor problems, capital goods shortages, and financial struggles 
have plagued the company since its incep t i~n .~  Formed in 1922, 
YPF was not clothed with significant official public authority 
until 195€L6 The role of the company has constantly varied based 
on the prevailing political climate. Further, YPF has never ma- 
tured to the point of being able to fulfill the country's petroleum 
needs without assistance from private investors and producers.' 
Currently, YPF is heavily in debt and is not receiving adequate 
prices for its production. In addition, government taxes are 
stripping the company of much of its  revenue^.^ Thus, based on 
YPFYs history and present status, Argentina will likely have a 
strong appetite for private petroleum investment and private 
hydrocarbon-seeking activities for the foreseeable f u t ~ r e . ~  
This comment explores the role of the private producer in 
the Argentine oil and gas industry. This comment does not focus 
on the political and economic turmoil in Argentina, but rather 
centers on the key legal arrangements under which a private en- 
tity can enter the country and engage in exploration and produc- 
tion activities. In addition, the philosophy and principles under- 
lying the country's petroleum legislation are examined, with 
special emphasis on the implications for a private petroleum 
producer considering entering the country to conduct business 
operations. By examining these two areas of consideration, a pri- 
vate producer can better understand how to conduct hydrocar- 
bon-seeking and -producing activities in Argentina, and will 
have a framework for anticipating and protecting himself against 
Argentina's volatile political and economic trends. 
4. C. SOLBERG, supra note 1, at 173-75 (charts showing historical production 
records); WORLD OIL, supra note 1. 
5. C. SOLBERC, supra note 1, at 40-45, 66-69, 98-99, 158-59, 164-65, 172; CNRET, 
supra note 2, at 161; Parker, Argentina Eyes More Private Oil Work, OIL & GAS J., Dec. 
6, 1982, at 121; WORLD OIL, supra note 1. 
6. [I9581 Law No. 14,773 (Argen.) (nationalization of fields of hydrocarbons), re- 
printed in PETROLEUM LEGISLATION Co., SOUTH AMERICA-BASIC OIL LAWS AND CONCES- 
SION CONTRACTS (ORIGINAL TEXTS) F-1 (SUPP. XIV 1967). 
7. C. SOLBERC, supra note 1, at 173-75 (production charts); WORLD OIL, supra note 
1. 
8. WORLD OIL, supra note 1; see also C. SOLBERG, supra note 1, at 172-73. 
9. See CNRET, supra note 2, at 45; Parker, supra note 5; WORLD OIL, supra note 1. 
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Argentina's basic petroleum law is Hydrocarbons Law 
17,319 of 1967, as amended by Law 21,778 of 1978." Under the 
provisions of these laws, private companies can participate in ex- 
ploration and development of hydrocarbons in three distinct 
ways: 
(1) Through "work or service contracts;"" 
(2) Through a concession-type approach;'* or 
(3) Through "risk contracts" with state enterprises.I3 
This comment focuses on the viability of the second and third 
types of arrangements. The first type of arrangement has been 
employed in various forms over the years and can be highly lu- 
crative for private companies.14 However, service contract trans- 
actions did not prove successful, from Argentina's point of view, 
in promoting sufficient exploration and development activities.'" 
Argentina's response to this shortcoming of service contracts has 
10. H. GREEN, ENERGY LAW GUIDE-WORLD PETROLEUM POLICY REPORT 3 13, a t  C-87 
(1981). 
11. [I9671 Hydrocarbons Law No. 17,319, arts. 11, 95 (Argen.), reprinted in PETRO- 
LEUM LEGISLATION CO., SOUTH AMERICA-BASIC OIL LAWS AND CONCESSION CONTRACTS 
(ORIGINAL TEXTS) A-4, A-31 (Supp. XIV 1967) [hereinafter cited as Law 17,3191. 
12. Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, a t  5, 9-10. 
13. Decree 2658, Buenos Aires, Argen., Nov. 6, 1978 (Regulations to Risk Contracts, 
Law 21,778, cl. 1, Apr. 14, 1978), reprinted in PETROLEUM LEGISLATION CO., SOUTH 
AMERICA-BASIC OIL LAWS AND CONCESSION CONTRACTS (ORIGINAL TEXTS) 1 (Supp. LIII 
1978) [hereinafter cited as Regulations]; Memorandum to the President of Argentina 
from Ministers of Justice, Economy & Interior (explaining Law No. 21,778 of Apr. 14, 
1978), reprinted in PETROLEUM LEGISLATION CO, SOUTH AMERICA-BASIC OIL LAW AND 
C o ~ c E s s l o ~  CONTRACTS (ORIGINAL TEXTS) 12 (Supp. LIII 1978) [hereinafter cited as 
Memorandum of Apr. 14, 19781. For examples of actual risk contracts, see Contract Re- 
sulting from the Bid (Licitacion No. 14-035/79) for the Development and Exploitation of 
Hydrocarbons of the "Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal Belt" Area-San Jorge Gulf Ba- 
sin-Argentine Sea, reprinted in PETROLEUM LEGISLATION CO. SOUTH AMERICA-BASIC 
OIL LAWS AND CONCESSION CONTRACTS (ORIGINAL TEXTS) 1 (Supp. LXV 1981) [hereinaf- 
ter cited as Contract for the "Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal Belt" Area]; Contract Result- 
ing from Bid No. 14-029179 for the Exploration, Development and Exploitation of Hy- 
drocarbons (Law No. 21,778) in "Llancanelo" Area-Neuquen Basin-Province of 
Mendoza, reprinted in PETROLEUM LEGISLATION CO., SOUTH AMERICA-BASIC OIL LAWS 
AND CONCESSION CONTRACTS (ORIGINAL TEXTS) 1 (Supp. LXVII 1981) [hereinafter cited 
as Contract for the "Llancanelo" Area]; Contract Resulting from the Bid (Licitacion No. 
14-023/79) for the Exploration, Development and Exploitation of Hydrocarbons (Law 
No. 21,778) of the "Malargue Sur" Area-Meuquina Basin-Mendoza Province, re- 
printed in PETROLEUM LEGISLATION CO., SOUTH AMERICA-BASIC OIL LAWS AND CONCES- 
SION CONTRACTS (ORIGINAL TEXTS) 1 (Supp. LXIII 1980) [hereinafter cited as Contract 
for the "Malargue Sur" Area]. 
14. CNRET, supra note 2, a t  31; see also C. SOLBERG, supra note 1, a t  168. 
15. Memarandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, a t  B-5. 
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been the enactment of its current laws. While these laws still 
allow for service contract transactions,le they emphasize involve- 
ment, through risk contracts or concession arrangements, in a 
three-tier structure consisting of surface prospecting, explora- 
tion, and exploitation activities. Each of these phases furnishes 
the private operator with unique rights and opportunities. 
A. Surface Prospecting 
Any civilly competent party, including universities and 
other research organizations, may conduct surface prospecting 
for the existence of hydrocarbons without being encumbered by 
the rigidity and burdens of the country's general exploration 
systems." By obtaining consent from surface owners and a per- 
mit from the government prescribing the scope and conditions of 
the reconnaissance, such a party may engage in "any . . . 
method appropriate for petroleum exploration."18 The prospect- 
ing can occur both onshore and offshore but it cannot infringe 
upon areas where exploration and exploitation permits have 
been awarded, most areas reserved for state enterprises, or areas 
that have been expressly banned from such activity by the Na+ 
tional Executive Power.'" Although this last restriction gives the 
state great discretion, the state does have important incentives 
for agreeing to such studies. First, the exercise of these rights 
does not generate any legal claim in the prospector to conduct 
more extensive exp l~ ra t i on .~~  Second, the prospector must de- 
liver "the primary data" of his surface inspection to the state.21 
Although the state cannot reveal the data for two years without 
the gatherer's permission, this restriction on divulgence is 
greatly weakened by an exception that provides for the release 
of the data in the event that a permit or concession is awarded 
in the area 
Consequently, if the state (which has the right to process 
16. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-4, A-31 (arts. 11,95); Memorandum of June 23, 
1967, supra note 3, at B-9, B-23. 
17. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-4, A-5 (arts. 14-15); Memorandum of June 23, 
1967, supra note 3, at B-12. 
18. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-4, A-5 (arts. 14-15). Some methods will necessi- 
tate obtaining approval from the state. The state can also inspect and control all of the 
works involved. Id. 
19. Id. at A-4, A-5 (art. 14). 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at A-5 (art. 15). 
22. Id. 
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the information, by itself or through the use of third persons, 
and to use the information for its own purposes) concludes that 
the property has hydrocarbon potential, it can put out a tender 
for bids on the property and then release the prospecting infor- 
mation to the party whose bid is selected.23 Also, the law does 
not indicate whether the prospecting information is available to 
state petroleum companies during this two-year period of confi- 
d e n t i a l i t ~ . ~ ~  The result is that the state gains a lot and gives up 
very little. On the other hand, the prospective producer could 
gain some very valuable information, but it is of no significant 
exploratory value to him unless he is prepared to compete for 
additional rights through a public bid. 
B. Exploration 
Under Laws 17,319 and 21,778, the most aggressive and po- 
tentially profitable petroleum activities are classified into two 
types: exploration and exp lo i t a t i~n .~~  Any given project may in- 
volve one or both of these types of activities, but it is not likely 
to intentionally include only an exploration phase. After all, the 
exploration phase is simply used to discover commercial deposits 
of hydrocarbons that justify commencing the exploitation stage. 
Under Law 17,319, and probably under Law 21,778, exploration 
rights are awarded only for "possible" zones.26 These are zones 
in which the presence of hydrocarbons in commercial quantities 
has yet to be proven.27 Properties containing proven reserves of 
commercially exploitable hydrocarbons are classified as 
66 proven," and only exploitation rights are awarded in such ar- 
e a ~ . ~ ~  Consequently, a program on "possible" lands involves 
23. Id. a t  A-14 (art. 45). Awards of permits and concessions under Law 17,319 are 
based on the bid which is "most conducive to the interest of the Nation." Id. at  A-15 
(art. 48). 
24. The National Executive Power can enlarge the areas reserved to the state com- 
panies. Id. at  A-4 (art. 11). 
25. [I9781 Hydrocarbons Law No. 21,778, art. 25 (Argen.), reprinted in PETROLEUM 
LEGISLATION CO., SOUTH AMERICA-BASIC OIL LAWS AND CONCESSION CONTRACTS (ORIGI- 
NAL TEXTS) 1, 11 (Supp. LIII 1978) [hereinafter cited as Law 21,7781; Law 17,319, supra 
note 11, a t  A-5, A-9 (arts. 16, 27). 
26. Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t  A-8 (art. 24). Law 21,778 operations are governed 
by ~ a w  17,319 in any matter that was not modified or specifically provided for under 
Law 21,778. Law 21,778, supra note 25, a t  11 (art. 26). For a definition of "possible 
zones," see Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t  A-4 (art. 10). 
27. Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t  A-4 (art. 10). 
28. See id. (arts. 24, 29); Contract for the "Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal Belt" Area, 
supra note 13, a t  2 (art. 1). 
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more risk and entails both an exploration phase and, if hydro- 
carbons are discovered in commercial quantities, an exploitation 
phase. A plan to develop a proven area presents less risk and 
only involves an exploitation phase.29 
The purpose of the exploration phase is to both require and 
authorize the private operator to search for commercial deposits 
within the bid area. This is a weeding out period for the state 
because a t  the end of the exploration period, any property that 
has not been explored or proven worthy of exploitation is relin- 
quished to the state.30 Activities during this period are con- 
ducted pursuant to work and investment commitments made in 
the bid.31 
Under Law 17,319 an exploration permit confers exclusive 
rights to search for hydrocarbons within the permit area during 
the period s p e ~ i f i e d . ~ ~  An exploration permit also authorizes the 
holder to undertake all works "conducive to the discovery of hy- 
drocarbons," including surface prospection, exploratory drilling, 
and construction of transportation, communication, and other 
necessary f a~ i l i t i e s .~~  Inherent in each exploration permit is an 
exclusive concession of the exploitation of any and all hydrocar- 
bon deposits found within the permit area.34 Within indicated 
time periods and under threat of specified penalties, a permit 
holder that discovers hydrocarbons must announce (1) the dis- 
covery of the hydrocarbons, (2) if the discovered deposit is com- 
mercially exploitable, and (3) his intentions concerning ob- 
29. See, e.g., Law 17,319, supra note 11, at  A-9 (art. 29, concessions on proven 
lands); Contract for the "Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal Belt" Area, supra note 13, a t  2 
(art. 1) (purpose of the contract is development and exploitation with no exploration 
phase included). 
30. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at  A-8, A-9 (art. 26); Regulations, supra note 13, at  
14-15 (cls. 10.1, 10.4). As an additional incentive to encourage prompt exploration, the 
exploration period is divided into smaller periods of time and, at the end of each small 
period, a minimum of 50% of all lands not converted to exploitation parcels or previ- 
ously relinquished are returned to the state. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at  A-8, A-9 (art. 
6); Regulations, supra note 13, a t  2, 14 (cls. 2.9, 10.1). 
31. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at  3-5 (art. 9); Law 17,319, supra note 11, at  A-6, A- 
7, A-15 (arts. 20, 47, 48). 
32. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at  A-5 (art. 16). The basic unit of an exploration 
permit is 100 square kilometers and a single permit cannot exceed an aggregate of 100 
units for an onshore permit or 150 units for an offshore permit. Id. at  A-8 (arts. 24, 25). 
33. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at  A-6 (art. 19); Memorandum of June 23, 1967, 
supra note 3, at  B-13. 
34. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at  A-6 (art. 17); Memorandum of June 23, 1967, 
supra note 3, at  B-13. 
4031 ARGENTINE PETROLEUM 409 
taining a concession and exp l~ i ta t ion .~~  Thus, the conclusion 
that commercially exploitable hydrocarbons have been discov- 
ered moves the Law 17,319 operator into the exploitation phase 
for that particular deposit. The awarding of an exploitation con- 
cession, however, does not terminate the permit holder's explo- 
ration rights for remaining lands not converted to a concession. 
As these residual lands are explored, they can enter the conces- 
sion phase or be relinquished to the state. At the end of the ex- 
ploration phase, all lands within the permit area that have not 
been converted into an exploitation concession must be given 
up.=' 
The exploration procedure under Law 21,778 closely resem- 
bles that of Law 17,319. The regulations to Law 21,778 provide 
that contracted works shall be carried out in two stages, one for 
exploration and the other for development and p r o d ~ c t i o n . ~ ~  
The 1980 Unionoil International Exploration Company, Ltd./In- 
alruco S.A. Petrolera Risk Contract explains that during the ex- 
ploration phase, the "Contractor must determine and notify . . . 
Y.P.F. whether . . . the . . . field . . . is considered commer- 
cially e~ploi table ."~~ The regulations also define (for investment 
and work commitment purposes) an exploration well as one 
drilled where no productive well has been previously drilled, or 
where a stratigraphic trap is sought, or, in some cases, where the 
purpose of drilling a well or wells is to delineate a field. In addi- 
tion to drilling wells, a Law 21,778 contractor is obligated to 
carry out a program of "exploration works" that will generate 
locations for drilling exploratory wells.39 A Law 21,778 contrac- 
tor who makes a discovery must present YPF with a plan for 
determining if the "deposit is commercial or not or if i t  can be- 
come one when exploited along with other disco~eries."~~ This 
moves the contractor into the exploitation phase for that 
deposit. 
Unlike Law 17,319, Law 21,778 does not set out stringent 
penalties for failure to announce a discovery or for concealment 
35. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-7, A-8 (arts. 21-22); Memorandum of June 23, 
1967, supra note 3, at B-14. 
36. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-7 to A-9 (arts. 22-23,26); Memorandum of June 
23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-14. 
37. Regulations, supra note 13, at 4 (cl. 3). 
38. Contract for the "Llancanelo" Area, supra note 13. 
39. Regulations, supra note 13, at 3-4 (cls. 2.13, 11.4). 
40. Id. at 5-6 (cl. 3.2.1); see also Contract for the "Malargue Sur" Area, supra note 
13, at 6-7 (art. 3.2.1) (maximum term for such a program is twenty-four months). 
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of a commercially exploitable field. I t  is possible that the provi- 
sions of Law 17,319 which pr-ovide for penalties also apply to 
Law 21,778. However, another explanation for the lack of speci- 
fied penalties in Law 21,778 may be the fact that a Law 21,778 
producer must sell all of his production, and provide extensive 
information, to state oil companies. Consequently, the state is 
more likely to know about a Law 21,778 disc~very.~' In contrast, 
a Law 17,319 operator has free marketing opportunities and thus 
more opportunities and incentives to conceal his disc~veries.'~ 
The Law 21,778 exploration period terminates, like the Law 
17,319 exploration period, with the relinquishment of lands not 
committed to exploitation lots and the cessation of the right to 
drill additional exploration wells.43 
C .  Exploitation 
The exploitation phase is designed to allow the private op- 
erator to reap the benefits of his exploration discoveries. Pursu- 
ant to work plans submitted to the state, the operator tries to 
realize the full potential of the deposits discovered, hopefully 
within the time period allotted. A Law 17,319 exploitation con- 
cession confers an exclusive right to exploit any hydrocarbon 
fields existing within the area specified by the concession during 
the established time period." Law 17,319 obligates the conces- 
sionaire to seek for and produce the maximum production that 
is consistent with economic and conservation concepts. Also, the 
operator must strive to develop the entire concession acreagesd6 
To assist the Law 17,319 producer in doing this, the statute 
gives the concessionaire the right to obtain a nonexclusive trans- 
portation concession, and various other ancillary privileges such 
as the right to build treating and refining plants, communication 
systems, and  building^.'^ 
Under Law 21,778, the basic unit for production and devel- 
41. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1, 5 (art. 4, 9(h)); Regulations, supra note 13, at 
20-22 (cls. 1.0, 15.0); see also Contract for the "Malargue Sur" Area, supra note 13, at 
15-16, 51-54 (art. 9, Annex IV). 
42. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-2, A-3 (art. 6); Memorandum of June 23, 1967, 
supra note 3, at B-5, B-10, B-11. 
43. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 4 (art. 9(d)); Regulations, supra note 13, at 14-15 
(CIS. 10.1, 10.2, 10.4). 
44. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-9, A-11 (arts. 27, 33-34). 
45. Id. at A-10 (art. 31). 
46. Id. at A-9, A-10 (arts. 28, 30); Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, at 
B-15. 
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opment is the "exploitation lot." These lots are defined as "the 
fraction within the area [originally] being bidded on in which 
the commercially exploitable hydrocarbons are l~calized."~' The 
Law 21,778 contractor agrees to promptly delineate the bounda- 
ries of the field'18 and to employ the most "reasonable and effi- 
cient techniques" in an effort to "obtain [the] maximum produc- 
tion of hydrocarbons compatible with the appropriate 
exploitation of same."4n 
1.  Direct exploitation activities 
Under both Law 17,319 and Law 21,778, there are two paths 
that lead to exploitation projects. The first is by way of an 
agreement to enter directly into exploitation activities without a 
preliminary exploration period.50 In this situation, a private 
party is concerned with (1) the land available to him, (2) the 
time limitations on his rights, (3) the work and investment com- 
mitments he is obligated to undertake, and (4) the fiscal regime 
he is subject to during the life of his concession. 
The state determines both the locations and the size of the 
properties that are available under Law 17,319 and Law 21,778.51 
Although only Law 17,319 specifies maximum acreages for an ex- 
ploitation concession, it does not appear that the size of an ex- 
ploitation parcel is a negotiable matter, especially when the orig- 
inal agreement is to perform exploitation operations only. A 
private entity interested in a particular area may submit a pro- 
posal concerning that area. If the state decides that such a rec- 
ommendation should, in the best interests of the nation, be fol- 
lowed, then a tender for bids will be put out on that area. The 
author of the proposal will be given preference only if his bid 
offer is equal to the best of all the offers made.s2 
In addition to land constraints, the rights of private petro- 
leum producers are of limited duration under the Argentine 
47. Regulations, supra note 13, a t  2, 5 (cls. 2.8, 3.2). 
48. Id. a t  19 (cl. 13.10) (six month period allotted). 
49. Law 21,778, supra note 25, a t  2 (art. 6(a)). Law 21,778 does not mention ancil- 
lary privileges so Law 17,319 rights should apply. Law 21,778, supra note 25, a t  11 (art. 
26) (matters not modified or expressly provided for in Law 21,778 are covered by Law 
17,319). 
50. Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t  A-9 (art. 29); Memorandum of June 23, 1967, 
supra note 3, a t  A-14. 
51. Law 21,778, supra note 25, a t  3-5 (art. 9); Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t  A-3 (art. 
9). 
52. Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t  A-14, A-15 (art. 46). 
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laws.63 When these lands revert to the state, operating equip- 
ment, fixed installations, and, in some cases, mobile accouter- 
ments are also transferred free of encumbrance to the state.64 A 
private operator must assure himself that, within the time frame 
allotted, the economics will be favorable to him based on how 
many wells will be drilled, expected production rates and pro- 
ductive lives of wells, and projected percentages of wells that 
will be dry. 
The operator will also be required to make work and invest- 
ment commitments for achieving his exploitation goals. Law 
17,319 provides that a concessionaire shall be "bound to make 
such investments as may be necessary, within reasonable periods 
of time, for the execution of the works required for the develop- 
ment of the entire acreage comprised in the area of his conces- 
sion . . . ."nn Law 21,778 requires a contractor to submit his 
timetable and investment plans to YPF.6B Except where force 
majeure, acts of God, or certain technical difficulties intervene, 
failure to meet Law 17,319 or Law 21,778 commitments can re- 
sult in penalization of the private entity including damages or 
cancellation of the agreementsn7 
Law 17,319 and Law 21,778 each have their own fiscal re- 
gime (i.e., taxes, rents, royalties) governing operations conducted 
under their provisions. The Law 17,319 fiscal regime tries to aid 
a private entity in preparing for a permit or concession and in 
realizing those plans. Law 17,319 does this by identifying in ad- 
vance, by type and amount, all of the financial obligations that a 
permit holder or concessionaire is liable for during the term of 
the agreement." These obligations include payment of: 
(1) All provincial and municipal taxes extant on the date of 
the award. Governing bodies cannot levy new taxes or in- 
crease preexisting taxes except when the changed rates re- 
present a defrayment of costs of services rendered or 
53. Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, at 14; Memorandum of June 23, 
1967, supra note 3, a t  B-10. 
54. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 4 (art. 9(e)); Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-11, 
A-12, A-29 (arts. 37,85); Regulations, supra note 13, at 17 (cl. 12); Memorandum of June 
23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-22; see also Contract for the "Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal 
Belt" Area, supra note 13, a t  8 (art. 5). 
55. Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t  A-10 (art. 31). 
56. Regulations, supra note 13, a t  21 (cl. 15.3). 
57. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 4-5 (art. 9(g)); Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-27 
to A-30 (arts. 80, 87-88). 
58. Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, a t  B-17. 
ARGENTINE PETROLEUM 413 
when the tax change constitutes a contribution toward 
improvements or a general increase of taxesbg 
All national tributes assessed on imported items, ex- 
change surcharges, and capital gains taxes. Aside from 
these, and the other taxes set forth below, the operator is 
exempt from all other national taxation (as to activities 
related to  his permit or concession) except for adjust- 
ments which defray costs of services provided or contrib- 
uted toward improvements or where the entity has as- 
sumed responsibility for a third party's tax liability.60 
A special income tax of 55% of the operator's net profits. 
The statute prescribes a formula for computing net 
 profit^.^' 
A progressive annual surface tax during the exploration 
period.62 
An annual surface tax during the exploitation period of 
20,000 pesos per square kilometer or fraction thereof.6s 
A 12% royalty on liquid hydrocarbons and natural gas 
that the National Executive Power can reduce by 5% if 
production conditions merit such a decrea~e.~' 
Any special benefits (e-g., bonuses, deferred or cumulative 
payments) that the private party committed to in the bid- 
ding proces~.'~ 
Additionally, any hydrocarbons lost through the fault or 
negligence of the operator shall be included as production 
in making these calc~la t ions .~~ 
This scheme is a benevolent effort by Argentina to be fair to 
private entities. The exceptions provided for in (1) and (2), how- 
ever, seem to open wide gaps tha t  minimize the  restrictions laid 
on new or increased taxes; and, unfortunately, the guaranty of a 
stable tax regime does not encompass a guaranty of a stable 
economy to operate in. 
Law 21,778 approaches the tax treatment of its contractors 
from a different angle than does Law 17,319. Rather than pre- 
scribing an intentionally stagnant fiscal regime, Law 21,778 per- 
59. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-17 (art. 56(a)). 
60. Id. at A-17, A-18 (art. 56(b)). Shareholders and direct pecuniary beneficiaries 
also come under this tax umbrella. Id. at A-20, A-21 (art. 56(d)). 
61. Id. at A-18 (art. 56(c)). 
62. Id. at A-21 (art. 57(a)). 
63. Id. (art. 58). 
64. Id. at A-21, A-22 (arts. 59, 62). 
65. Id. at A-15, A-23 (arts. 47, 64). 
66. Id. at A-23 (art. 65). 
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mits the use of price escalator clauses in risk contracts to adjust 
prices paid to operators for their production in response to "the 
precise incidence" of tax  fluctuation^.'^ However, similar to the 
provisions of Law 17,319, "service rates and betterment taxes" 
are excluded.6s Law 21,778 contractors must abide by Argen- 
tina's "tax regulations of general appl i~abi l i ty"~~ with two op- 
tions concerning a modified depreciation rule and an option to 
update tax losses based on the general level of the wholesalers 
price index.?O The nation's stamp tax assessment is based on the 
contractor's investment commitment in the risk contract and is 
payable over a term that commences on the date the contractor 
is notified of the decree approving the risk contract.?' 
An annual surface fee (per square kilometer or fraction 
thereof) is set in the call for bids. The amount of the fee relates 
to the characteristics of the particular bid area.72 A special 100% 
deduction is granted for certain investments that underwrite the 
stock of Argentine companies engaged in risk con t r a~ t i ng .~~  
Goods, special tools, parts, components, and some spares and ac- 
cessories are exempted from import duties upon entry into the 
country and from export duties upon leaving Argentina when 
the contract expires.74 Investments made by contractors are not 
subject to certain foreign investment regulations and YPF is lia- 
ble for the 12% royalty on production that is payable to the 
state.76 Obviously, a more thorough knowledge of the country's 
general tax structure is needed before potential risk contractors 
should attempt interpreting these provisions. 
67. Law 21,778, supra note 25, a t  7 (art. 15); Regulations, supra note 13, a t  24-25 
(cl. 17.2). 
68. Law 21,778, supra note 25, a t  7 (art. 15); Regulations, supra note 13, a t  24-25 
(cl. 17.2). 
69. Law 21,778, supra note 25, a t  6-7, 10 (arts. 14, 20). 
70. Law 21,778, supra note 25, a t  6-7 (arts. 14(a), 14(b)); Regulations, supra note 13, 
a t  24 (cls. 17.1, 17.l(a), 17.l(b)). For an example of tax regimes in actual risk contracts, 
see Contract for the "Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal Belt" Area, supra note 13, a t  27 (art. 
13). 
71. Law 21,778, supra note 25, a t  7 (art. 16). 
72. Id. (art. 17); Regulations, supra note 13, a t  25 (cl. 17.4). 
73. Law 21,778, supra note 25, a t  8-9 (art. 18); Memorandum of Apr. 14,1978, supra 
note 13, a t  14-15. 
74. Law 21,778, supra note 25, a t  9-10 (art. 19) (compensation for services is ex- 
pected from this.exemption; there are limitations on the sale and movement of these 
imported goods); Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, a t  15. 
75. Law 21,778, supra note 25, a t  10 (art. 23); Regulations, supra note 13, a t  25 (cl. 
17.3); Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, a t  15-16. 
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2. Exploitation following exploration activities 
The second way a private producer can enter into an ex- 
ploitation phase is through exploratory discoveries that precipi- 
tate conversions of exploration lands into exploitation lands.76 
For a Law 17,319 exploration permit holder, this is triggered 
when "the permit holder through the application of approved 
technical criteria shall have determined the existence of com- 
mercially exploitable  hydrocarbon^."^^ When this vague stan- 
dard has been met, the permit holder must declare his plans 
concerning an exploitation conce~s ion .~~  Then, a concession will 
be awarded and the new concessionaire must submit his work 
and investment commitments for the exploitation phase for ap- 
proval by the state.78 A Law 17,319 concessionaire has a duty to 
delimit the productive area (which the concession boundaries 
will conform to) as promptly as possible.80 This is likely to be a 
natural goal of the concessionaire anyway owing to the imperma- 
nent nature of his rights. 
The Law 21,778 approach to exploitation ensuing from ex- 
ploration shows more oilfield sense than the Law 17,319 provi- 
sions do for such a conversion by laying out a more extensive 
and practical procedure for the changeover. When a Law 21,778 
contractor discovers a deposit of hydrocarbons, he begins the 
transition into exploitation by announcing to YPF his plans for 
determining if the accumulation has, by itself or in combination 
with other discoveries, commercial p ~ t e n t i a l . ~ ~  The pursuance of 
such a program will then result in one of three conclusions con- 
cerning the investigated hydrocarbon traps: it is commercial, it 
is not commercial, or its commerciality is still unclear. 
If a deposit is labelled noncommercial, the contractor must 
immediately release all areas coinciding with the trap that was 
tested.82 However, if the operator is hesitant to label a property 
76. Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t  A-6, A-9 (arts. 17, 29). 
77. Id. a t  A-7, A-8 (art. 22). 
78. Id. Indeed, an exploration permit holder who makes a discovery cannot proceed 
with field exploitation until he has committed to opt for an exploitation concession. Id. 
a t  A-7 (art. 21). 
79. Id. a t  A-10 (art. 32). 
80. Id. a t  A-10, A-11 (art. 33). 
81. Regulations, supra note 13, a t  5-6 (cl. 3.2.1); see also Contract for the "Llan- 
canelo" Area, supra note 13, at  7-8 (art. 3.2.1) (contractor has up to twenty-four months 
to carry out its program for determining commerciality). 
82. Regulations, supra note 13, a t  6 (cl. 3.2.3); see also Contract for the "Malargue 
Sur" Area, supra note 13, a t  7 (art. 3.2.3). 
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noncommercial and, at  the same time, is not convinced of the 
prospect's commerciality (e.g., it could be commercial if ex- 
ploited with other discoveries or if prices were to increase 
slightly), the contractor is permitted to postpone the declaration 
of his conclusion. The maximum permissible length of this post- 
ponement will be set out in a "document of particular condi- 
tions," but in no event shall it extend beyond the end of the 
exploitation stage time period.83 
If a deposit is determined to be commercial, then the con- 
tractor must submit all of his geologic and engineering informa- 
tion to YPF along with a plan for full e~p lo i t a t ion .~~  Law 
21,778's enactment was specifically aimed a t  encouraging the 
discovery and development of Argentina's offshore  reserve^.^^ 
Accordingly, Law 21,778 has a unique provision. When an off- 
shore gas field is discovered, the exploitation period may be sus- 
pended for up to ten years to await the development of a market 
and transportation facilities for the gas.86 
An operator who commences exploitation as a result of con- 
version from exploration must still concern himself with the ap- 
plicable fiscal regime, time periods limiting his rights, and work 
and investment commitments as described above. The quantity 
of land available to him will be based largely on the initiative he 
takes and his success in finding exploitable fields. Both Law 
17,319 and Law 21,778, therefore, provide a legal mechanism for 
converting new discoveries into production and development 
programs, but the Law 21,778 system is clearer and better calcu- 
lated to conform to oilfield practices. 
This section analyzes the underlying principles of Argen- 
tina's petroleum laws and the impact those principles have on 
private producers. Two of these principles, state dominance of 
the petroleum industry and Argentina's need for private activity 
in the petroleum industry, are in constant tension. The dynam- 
ics of the conflict between these principles help to explain 
changes in the country's petroleum policy. Another one of the 
83. Regulations, supra note 13, at 6 (cl. 3.2.4). 
84. Regulations, supra note 13, at 6, 21 (cls. 3.2.2, 15.3); see also Contract for the 
"Malargue Sur" Area, supra note 13, at 7, 16 (arts. 3.2.2, 9.3). 
85. Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, at 13, 16. 
86. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 4 (art. 9(e)). 
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fundamental principles, private responsibility for the mining 
risks of exploration and exploitation, does not present a new 
concept for private producing entities. The final principle deals 
with ownership of the hydrocarbons that are produced and the 
consequences of ownership or nonownership to a private entity. 
After studying these essential principles, a private producer will 
recognize and understand the general concerns he should have 
about the Argentine petroleum industry. 
A. State Dominance us. Dependence on Private Investment 
and Activity 
"[I]ndespensable [sic] . . . control of the state over all as- 
pects involved inwB7 the exploration, exploitation, transportation, 
and marketing of hydrocarbons characterizes Argentina's petro- 
leum leg i s la t i~n .~~  Undergirding this philosophy of state domi- 
nance is Law 17,319's pronouncements that the nation's hydro- 
carbons are "inalienable and imprescriptible assets" of the 
state.8s The National Executive Power controls the legal mecha- 
nisms of the petroleum industry by making major policy deci- 
sions under Law 17,319 and by approving all risk contracts 
under Law 21,778." The Secretary of Energy assists the Na- 
tional Executive Power by applying and executing these laws.81 
"State companies" are the "essential agents" for the state in its 
petroleum activities and these companies play a dominant role 
in the accomplishment of the national  objective^.^^ Strategic 
proven and prospective hydrocarbon lands are reserved for the 
sole dominion of the state companies to aid them in fulfilling 
their assigned  function^.^^ 
The National Executive Power sets its policies in accor- 
dance with the express national objective of meeting the coun- 
87. Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-1. 
88. Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, at 13; Memorandum of June 23, 
1967, supra note 3, at B-4. 
89. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-1 (art. 1). This approach solves a multiplicity of 
jurisdictions problem that has plagued the development of a national policy, but it also 
raises constitutional issues concerning ownership and procedural jurisdiction over hydro- 
carbon reserves. These issues have been hotly debated for many years. See id. at A-4 
(art. 12) (provinces to participate equally with the national government in provincial 
production). 
90. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 5-6 (arts. 12,13); Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A- 
1, A-32 (arts. 3, 98). 
91. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-26, A-32 (arts. 75, 97). 
92. Id. at A-4, A-30 (arts. 11, 91). 
93. Id. 
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try's petroleum needs from indigenous produ~tion.'~ Law 17,319 
was directed toward accomplishing this goal through the grant- 
ing of exploitation concessions. When it became evident that 
Law 17,319 alone would not meet this Law 21,778 was 
enacted to stimulate further activity by allowing the state com- 
panies to enter into risk contracts with private en ti tie^."^ These 
nonpublic entities were to assist state companies in developing 
those lands reserved to them, especially offshore  prospect^.'^ 
Another basic theme, partially expressed and partially im- 
plied, of Argentina's petroleum laws is the country's great need 
for the economic and technical assistance that private invest- 
ment and other private involvement provide. In the petroleum 
sector itself, private entities can supply the tremendous financial 
resources required for petroleum exploration, particularly in off- 
shore projects." Private companies also have technical abilities 
that the state  need^.'^ Both Law 17,319 and Law 21,778'0•‹ re- 
quire private operators that want to participate in Argentina's 
petroleum industry to possess the technical competence and fi- 
nancial resources necessary to perform the works that will be re- 
quired of them. By surpassing the "dubious efficiency (resulting 
from) . . . subordinating the extraction of hydrocarbons to the 
technical and economic resources of the state,"'O1 a petroleum 
industry buoyed up by private money and ingenuity gives des- 
perately needed support to the country's quest for "economic 
expansion on reasonable technical and economic bases."'02 Aside 
from boosting the petroleum industry, private participation is 
expected to stimulate local industry and increase employment.'03 
Despite "the acknowledged competence of Argentine technical 
94. Id. at A-1 (art. 2);  Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-8 to B-10. 
95. CNRET, supra note 2, at 45. 
96. Regulations, supra note 13, at 1 (cl. 1); Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra 
note 13, at 12. 
97. Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, at 12-13, 16; WORLD OIL, supra 
note 1, at 125-32. 
98. Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, at 13; Memorandum of June 23, 
1967, supra note 3, at B-4; CNRET, supra note 2, at 45. 
99. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 2).  
100. Id.; Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-1, A-2 (art. 5);  Regulations, supra note 13, 
at 1, 8-9 (cls. 1, 5.2); Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-13. 
101. Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-2. 
102. Id. at B-1. 
103. Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, at 16; Memorandum of June 23, 
1967, supra note 3, at B-4. 
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personnel and  labourer^,"'^^ a private producer is required 
under both Law 17,319 and Law 21,778 to employ a high per- 
centage of Argentinians.lo5 
Even though the Argentine petroleum legislation is founded 
on the principle of state control, this principle is in constant ten- 
sion with and must be balanced against Argentina's genuine 
need for private involvement in accomplishing its petroleum and 
economic goals. Unfortunately, Argentina's administration of its 
hydrocarbon laws sometimes does not reflect the country's sub- 
stantial need for private involvement and, when this happens, 
both Argentina and the private operators suffer.lo6 
The exact impact this struggle between state dominance of 
natural resource development and reliance upon private invest- 
ment and technology will have on the private operator is diffi- 
cult to anticipate. Some general observations would be more ap- 
propriate. A private producer planning to operate in Argentina 
for the entire duration of a risk contract or concession agree- 
ment should expect to experience all ranges of the spectrum of 
government dominance.'07 An initial indicator of the tenor of the 
Argentine government at  a particular time is the political ideol- 
ogy of the governing authorities. Economic nationalist leaders 
favor energy self-sufficiency spawned by active government in- 
volvement. Government involvement can range from tariff pro- 
tection and an infrastructure base designed to stimulate private 
Argentine exploration and production efforts, to complete state 
dominance of the petroleum industry. Economic liberalist lead- 
ers, on the other hand, welcome foreign investment and involve- 
ment in petroleum-seeking and -producing activities. Economic 
liberalism in Argentina is export based and is founded on cordial 
foreign relations and interchange. 
These philosophical labels are of limited value, however, be- 
cause Argentine politicians do not always remain loyal, a t  least 
in practice, to their ideological classifications. Still, even though 
theoretical bases are of limited value in predicting how Argen- 
104. Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-21. 
105. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-25 (art. 4); Regulations, supra note 13, at 19-20 
(cl. 13.12). 
106. Parker, supra note 5; WORLD OIL, supra note 1. 
107. This is exemplified by the varying treatment afforded to Standard Oil Com- 
pany of New Jersey and its subsidiaries. See generally C. SOLBERG, supra note 1. See 
also R. MIKESELL, W. BARTSCH, J. BEHRMAN, P. CHURCH. G EDWARDS, H. GOMEZ, W. HAR- 
RIS, M. MAMALAKIS, D. WELLS, M. WIONCZEK & J. ZINSER, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE 
PETROLEUM AND MINERAL INDUSTRIES 157-88 (1971). 
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tine rulers will direct the petroleum industry, it is important to 
monitor the country's political development as effectively as 
possible because political developments may prove to be the sin- 
gle most critical factor in the progress or lack of progress of Ar- 
gentina's petroleum i n d ~ s t r y . ' ~ ~  
In many ways, the Argentine conflict between state control 
of and private contribution to the oil and gas industry typifies 
the petroleum technology transfer battle that developing coun- 
tries have waged with private oil cornpanie~. '~~ Hydrocarbon ex- 
ploration and exploitation activities are markedly enhanced by 
technological abilities and advancements. Historically, private 
multinational corporations have provided the technology re- 
quired for worldwide petroleum operations. Naturally, sovereign 
countries want to control the use and depletion of their indige- 
nous natural resources. Hence, as in Argentina, an ensuing 
struggle sets the governments of developing countries (that .want 
to regulate the development of their own energy resources) 
against the private oil companies (that are seeking to fulfill their 
own ends) possessing the technology needed for resource utiliza- 
tion. Initially, this confrontation produced concession arrange- 
ments giving wide latitude to the oil companies and providing 
limited financial benefits but no technological benefits to the 
host countries."O Such concession arrangements were present 
under early Argentine oil laws.''' Gradually, developing coun- 
tries began using petroleum contracts and other means to de- 
velop petroleum technology among their own industries and la- 
bor  market^."^ 
Provisions under Law 17,319 and Law 21,778 that require 
the hiring and training of Argentine nationals, the delivery of 
oilfield information to the state, and the reversion of production 
equipment and facilities to the state are examples of Argentine 
efforts to acquire te~hnology."~ Additionally, Argentina has a 
108. At least one business advisor feels that energy progress is closely related t o  
politics. See Wanniski, Energy In Abundance, LANDMAN, Jan. 1983, at 7-12. 
109. See generally Zakariya, Transfer of Technology Under Petroleum Deuelop- 
ment Contracts, 16 J. WORLD TRADE L. 207 (1982). 
110. See CNRET, supra note 2, at 109-10, 152; Zakariya, supra note 109, at 211. 
111. See Memorandum of  June 23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-1, B-2; C.  SOLBERC, 
supra note 1, at 14-15. 
112. See Zakariya, supra note 109, at 210-22. 
113. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 4, 5 (arts. 9(e), 9(h)); Law 17,319, supra note 11, 
at A-11, A-12, A-24, A-25 (arts. 15, 37, 70, 71); see also Zakariya, supra note 109, at 211- 
15. 
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petroleum technology training institute and belongs to ARPEL, 
a Latin American association of state petroleum enterprises.l14 A 
complete transfer of technology 
lies in the ability of the developing country to purchase or hire 
directly the most advanced technical means of petroleum ex- 
ploration and development, if and when it so wishes, at a rea- 
sonable price. It also lies above all, in developing the mental 
skills of its citizens to utilize these technical means effectively, 
alone if they choose to do so."' 
However, a full technology transfer is closely tied to economic 
and industrial development in the developing country.l16 Argen- 
tina's shortcomings in these areas make it probable that a com- 
plete technological transfer is a distant dream for Argentina, but 
it is likely that private operators in the country will be faced 
with demands from the government to assist this transfer of 
technology. 
Finally, in understanding the state dominance versus pri- 
vate participation conflict, the concepts of political ideology and 
technology transfer must be set afloat on the underlying sea of 
social, economic, and political problems that plague Argentina. 
As a developing country, Argentina seems like a child that is dis- 
satisfied with what it has and yet does not know what it wants. 
For the oil industry, the result of Argentina's uneasiness is a 
constantly changing oil p01icy."~ The country would like to pay 
fair oil prices to producers, yet economic problems make this 
difficult. Socially and politically, some forces in Argentina would 
like to achieve energy self-sufficiency, but the country lacks the 
financial and technological ability to do so."8 The consequences 
to the private operator are uncertainty and instability in the pe- 
troleum industry. 
B. Risk and Ownership 
Under both Law 17,319 and Law 21,778, the private opera- 
114. See CNRET, supra note 2, at 82-91; see also Zakariya, supra note 109, at 208, 
220. 
115. Zakariya, supra note 109, at 219. 
116. Id. at 222. 
117. See C. SOLBERG, supra note 1, at 156-76. Law 21,778 was enacted in 1978 and, 
by 1982, the country was considering new major changes in its oil legislation. See gener- 
ally WORLD OIL, supra note 1. 
118. See Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-1 (art. 3); Memorandum of June 23, 1967, 
supra note 3, at A-8; C. SOLBERG, supra note 1, at 172-77; CNRET, supra note 2, at 45. 
422 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I984 
tor assumes all "hazards defined as mining r i~k.""~ Producers 
operating under Law 17,319 own the hydrocarbons they produce, 
including the right to transport, refine, and market their produc- 
tion.120 This system is designed to provide "substantial incen- 
tives" by opening up the vistas of vertical integration (e.g., mar- 
keting, exportation) to nonpublic entities.lZ1 The exercise of 
nonproduction rights, however, is subject to regulation by the 
National Executive Power. Some initial regulations are set forth 
in Law 17,319. For example, liquid hydrocarbons can be sold 
only in domestic markets until the objective of petroleum self- 
sufficiency is met.lZ2 In addition, all natural gas produced in Ar- 
gentina is subject to a first purchase option granted to the 
"State-owned enterprise responsible for the public service of gas 
d is t r ib~t ion." '~~ 
In contrast to Law 17,319, companies contracting under 
Law 21,778 receive no legal rights under applicable mining laws, 
"nor will they have ownership of the hydrocarbons so ob- 
tained."lZ4 However, if domestic needs are satisfied from indige- 
nous production and an adequate supply of reserves has been 
accumulated, the contractor may receive payment in kind.lZ6 AS 
a limitation on this practice, however, YPF can restrict payment 
in kind to crudes so that even when national requirements are 
met, natural and liquified gas may not be available in kind.lZ6 
In the simplest sense, the procedures under Law 17,319 and 
Law 21,778 are very similar and, from a producer's viewpoint, 
the ownership distinctions between the laws are not crucial. 
Both laws prescribe a system mandating delivery of a specified 
119. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 2); Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-1, A-2 
(art. 5). 
120. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-2, A-3 (art. 6); Memorandum of June 23, 1967, 
supra note 3, at B-5, B-10, B-11. 
121. Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-5, B-15. 
122. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at B-2, B-3 (art. 6). This limitation is subject to 
exceptions justified on technical grounds. Id.; Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 
3, at B-10. The Executive Power may prescribe rules which assure an equitable and ra- 
tional participation by all companies in the domestic market. Law 17,319, supra note 11, 
at B-2, B-3 (art. 6). 
123. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-3, B-2 (art. 6); Memorandum of June 23, 1967, 
supra note 3, at B-11 (operators can consume hydrocarbons as needed for their 
operations). 
124. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 3); Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra 
note 13, at 13. 
125. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 4); Regulations, supra note 13, at 1, 23 
(cls. 1, 16.2.3); Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, at 13, 14. 
126. Regulations, supra note 13, at 23 (cl. 16.2.3). 
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amount of production into internal markets, after which the pro- 
ducer may dispose of any excess output as he chooses.127 Within 
these basic procedural frameworks, however, differences between 
the Law 21,778 operator and the Law 17,319 concessionaire do 
emerge. These disparities, which are largely rooted in ownership 
rights, can be recognized and managed by the producer by stud- 
ying the price the producer can receive for his production and 
the likelihood that the producer will have an available market 
for all of this production. Additionally, the producer must con- 
sider the quantity of his production over which he will have ex- 
portation rights. These factors, and not ownership differences, 
become critical in the producer's analysis of his opportunities for 
profitable operations in Argentina. 
In evaluating the prices available for his production, a pro- 
ducer interested in exploring in Argentina should ascertain the 
relative prices obtainable under Law 17,319 and Law 21,778 
transactions. Also, since the producer is committed to serving 
local markets until domestic needs are met, the producer must 
compare prices available in Argentina to world oil prices.128 For 
liquid hydrocarbons, Law 17,319 concessionaires have more price 
latitude than Law 21,778 contractors because concessionaires 
have transportation and marketing rights to their p roduc t i~n . '~~  
Law 21,778 operators are obligated, until payment in kind is al- 
lowed, to sell their output to "the state company,"130 whereas 
the only significant restriction put on crude prices by Law 
17,319 is that the National Executive Power might set prices.131 
However, the statute tries to temper this possibility by assuring 
that "reasonable profits" will be attainable and that even if 
prices are set by the National Executive Power, they will be 
equal to those established for the state oil company and will not 
be lower than those prevailing for imported crudes of similar 
127. Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t  B-2, B-3 (arc. 6) (operator must obtain a com- 
mercially reasonable price for exported crude). 
128. See Argentine Contract Talks Hit Snags, OIL & GAS J., Jan. 10, 1983, a t  44. 
Sagging prices have proven to be a major flaw in the Argentine oil industry and, com- 
bined with soaring inflation and political instability, have resulted in a downward pro- 
duction trend in the country. Enright, World Oil Flow, Refining Capacity Down 
Sharply; Reserves Increase, OIL & GAS J., Dec. 27, 1982, a t  75,77,79; Parker, supra note 
5; WORLD OIL, supra note 1. 
129. Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t  A-2, A-3 (art. 6); Memorandum of  June 23, 1967, 
supra note 3, a t  B-5. 
130. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 4); Regulations, supra note 13, a t  1 (cl. 1). 
131. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at  A-2, A-3 (art. 6). 
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quality and under similar  condition^.'^^ This latter provision 
should serve to keep Law 17,319 prices a t  the world market 
level. 
Law 21,778 crude producers are subject to a more nebulous 
price structure, with the payment in cash being based on "the 
unit of measurement corresponding to the type of hydrocarbon 
obtained and delivered . . . Since these price standards are 
set by the state and a risk contractor can sell crude only to the 
state until payment in kind is made, the Law 21,778 risk con- 
tractor has no control over the price he receives for his domesti- 
cally marketed crude. He will be paid according to the state's 
established price structure. 
For gas, Law 17,319 provides that gas prices shall be set by 
agreement and that the prices "shall assure the operator an eq- 
uitable return on the corresponding inve~trnent."'~~ This provi- 
sion, combined with the state company's preemptive right to 
purchase a concessionaire's gas output, puts the Law 17,319 gas- 
producing concessionaire in much the same position as the Law 
21,778 gas-producing contractor that must sell under contract to 
the state company based on the same price framework that Law 
21,778 crude contractors are subject to.13' The similarity is fur- 
ther enhanced by Law 21,778's authorization allowing YPF to 
prevent payment in kind for natural and liquid gas (i.e., YPF 
can limit payment in kind to crude pe t r~ l eum) , ' ~~  which, in ef- 
fect, gives the state a first option to purchase on all of a Law 
21,778 risk contractor's gas production. 
Before a petroleum producer commences an exploration 
program, the producer wants to be assured that he will be able 
132. Id. at  A-2, A-31 (art. 6); Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, a t  B-11. 
It  appears that this last guarantee has not been abided by. A. IGLESIA, POLITICA PE- 
TROLERA ARGENTINE 263 (1980). Perhaps this failure to meet world prices can be ex- 
plained by the sudden upturn in the world price in recent years and by the Law 17,319 
exception which provides that "[s]hould the prices of imported crudes be substantially 
increased due to exceptional circumstances, such prices shall not be taken into consider- 
ation for establishing the domestic marketing prices . . . ." Law 17,319, supra note 11, 
a t  A-2 (art. 6). 
133. Law 21,778, supra note 25, a t  1 (art. 4); see also Regulations, supra note 13, a t  
1 (cl. 1). For an example of crude price formulas in risk contracts, see Contract for the 
"Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal Belt" Area, supra note 13, at 22-23 (art. 11.1). 
134. Law 17,319, supra note 11, a t  A-3 (art. 6). 
135. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 4); Regulations, supra note 13, a t  1 (cl. 1); 
Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, a t  13. For an example of risk contract gas 
formulas, see Contract for the "Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal Belt" Area, supra note 13, 
a t  23-24 (arts. 11.2, 11.3). 
136. Regulations, supra note 13, a t  23 (cl. 16.2.3). 
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to market his product commercially. This should not present a 
major problem for a Law 17,319 producer. The free market ac- 
cess allowed to such a producer provides him with the opportu- 
nity to solve any major marketing obstacles during both 
nonexportation and exportation periods. Even though a Law 
17,319 gas producer must first offer his gas to the state company, 
such option to purchase must be exercised by the state within 
"reasonable time limits" and the producer can, with appropriate 
approval and subject to prescribed regulations, decide on the 
disposition of any gas not purchased by the state.13' 
The Law 21,778 producer, on the other hand, has only one 
buyer prior to payment in kind-the state.'38 Such a contractor 
could find himself in a difficult position if the state company is 
unwilling (e.g., because the quality of the crude is not suited to 
the state company's refining facilities) or unable (e.g., lack of 
storage capacity) to take the contractor's product while, a t  the 
same time, domestic production has not satisfied domestic needs 
so that the payment in kind alternative is also not available to 
the contractor. The Law 21,778 operator must contractually an- 
ticipate these eventualities and obtain either guarantees of re- 
ceipt of his production in reasonable geographic locations with 
penalties against the state for failure to comply, or the right to 
dispose freely of any excess production not taken by the state 
company. Additionally, provisions should be made stipulating 
who bears the costs when additional storage or transportation 
facilities are required to sustain receipt of the private operator's 
production by the state company. Various provisions along this 
line have been used by risk contractors including: 
(1) A guarantee of reception of a specified volume of crude oil 
by YPF with options for the contractor to dispose of any 
excess. 
(2) Specification of the reception standards that the hydro- 
carbons must meet (e.g., water content, salinity levels). 
(3) Agreements on when the contractor will not be obliged to 
make certain production related investments. 
(4) Provisions for reinjection or commercial disposal (with a 
137. Law 17,319, supra note 11, A-2, A-3 (art. 6); Memorandum of June 23, 1967, 
supra note 3, at B-11, B-12. 
138. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 4); Regulations, supra note 13, at 1 (cl. 1). 
For an example of actual production, delivery, and transportation clauses in risk con- 
tracts, see Contract for the "Llancanelo" Area, supra note 13, at 21-30 (art. 10, Annex V, 
Annex VI). 
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partial payment to YPF) of gas that YPF cannot receive 
or for which transportation facilities are not available. 
Allowance of construction and operation by the private 
contractor of equipment for obtaining liquified gas. 
Assessment of penalties against YPF for failure to comply 
with its reception requirements for any causes other than 
force majeure or fortuitous case. 
Provision for who bears the cost of storage and treatment 
facilities. 
Provision, as part of two thermal stimulation pilot 
projects, that the contractor and YPF shall agree on the 
conditions under which the contractor may dispose of 
crude oil not disposed of by YPF. 
Provisions concerning transportation to YPF's point of 
reception.lsg 
Obviously, a private operator can make only limited de- 
mands when dealing with a foreign sovereign in a competitive 
bidding situation. Nevertheless, the contracting company must 
protect itself by assuring reception of its production on the most 
favorable terms possible. 
A final important concern of a private operator working in 
Argentina is the quantity of his production that will be available 
for exportation. In a country such as Argentina that has severe 
economic problems and chronic political instability, an operator 
wants t o  have free rein, including the right t o  export as much of 
his production as is possible. The ability to export provides an 
opportunity to circumvent unfavorable market conditions within 
the country. Nevertheless, Argentine production must satisfy 
Argentine petroleum needs before any private operator may 
truly claim freedom to dispose of his production, especially the 
freedom to export that p roduc t i~n . ' ~~  Additionally, the restric- 
tions on export rights to natural gas are more stringent than 
those for crude petroleum.141 A Law 17,319 producer of 'liquid 
hydrocarbons has to be authorized by the National Executive 
139. For examples, see Contract for the "Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal Belt" Area, 
supra note 13, at 14-15, 18-19, 20 (arts. 10.1, 10.2.2, 10.3); Contract for the "Llancanelo" 
Area, supra note 13, at 23-26 (arts. 10.1, 10.2.2, 10.3); Contract for the "Malargue Sur" 
Area, supra note 13, at 17-19, 21 (arts. 10.1, 10.2.2, 10.3). 
140. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 4); Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-2, A-3 
(art. 6); Regulations, supra note 13, at 1 (cl. 1); Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra 
note 13, at 1-14; Memorandum of June 23, 1967, supra note 3, at B-10, B-11. 
141. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 4); Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-2, A-3 
(art. 6); Regulations, supra note 13, at 1, 23 (cls. 1, 16.2.3). 
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Power to export crude supplies that are "in excess of the normal 
needs of the internal market."lq2 
Aside from meeting domestic production goals, the only 
statutory restrictions placed on the right to export are that the 
prices received for the exported production be commercially rea- 
sonable in 'light of the international market and that the opera- 
tor submit to any promulgated rules designed to accomplish eq- 
uitable participation in the internal market by all producers 
within the Similar in nature, but slightly more re- 
strictive, is the Law 21,778 proviso that a contracting company 
may receive payment in kind when domestic production meets 
domestic demand and an "adequate margin of reserves [as de- 
creed by the National Executive Power] has been estab- 
li~hed.""~ 
One further drawback that a contractor might experience is 
that if crude risk contract prices in Argentina are low and pay- 
ment in kind is made based on the cash price, the operator may 
be disappointed at  the quantity of crude received as payment in 
kind. However, both the 1980 Unionoil International Explora- 
tion Company, Ltd./Inalruco S.A. Petrolera Risk C o n t r a ~ t ' ~ ~  and 
the 1979 Occidental De Argentina Inc./Bridas/Union Texas1 
Compania Quimica Risk Contractlq6 provide that once the con- 
tractor has invoiced YPF for crude for which payment is due in 
kind, the contractor may "dispose of said Crude Oil immedi- 
ately."lq7 So the Law 21,778 crude oil threshold point for export 
rights is higher than the Law 17,319 threshold level, but once a 
Law 21,778 contractor that has contracted to receive payment in 
kind reaches the payment in kind stage for crude, he has un- 
restricted rights of disposition. 
For natural gas exportation rights, a private operator must 
overcome more legal obstacles than for crude exportation rights. 
142. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-2, A-3 (art. 6); Memorandum of June 23, 1967, 
supra note 3, at B-10, B-11. 
143. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-2, A-3 (art. 6); Memorandum of June 23, 1967, 
supra note 3, at B-10, B-11. 
144. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 4); see also Regulations, supra note 13, at 
1 (cl. 1). Payment in kind is available only if "clauses contemplating such possibility and 
the basis for pricing the hydrocarbons delivered in payment have bcen incorporated to 
the corresponding contract." Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 4). 
145. Contract for the "Llancanelo" Area, supra note 13. 
146. Contract for the "Malargue Sur" Area, supra note 13. 
147. Contract for the "Llancanelo" Area, supra note 13, at 37 (art. 11.4); Contract 
for the "Malargue Sur" Area, supra note 13, at 28 (art. 11.5). 
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Under Law 17,319, a concessionaire may, upon obtaining appro- 
priate consent, decide upon the disposal and utilization of any 
natural gas not purchased by the state company. There is no 
limit, though, on how much of his production the state company 
can purchase,148 making uncertain the availability of export 
rights. Even more restrictive is the Law 21,778 reservation by 
the state of the right to refuse any payment in kind on any "nat- 
ural and liquid gas produced."149 Thus, a Law 21,778 gas pro- 
ducer may not receive payment in kind even after domestic de- 
mand is met and an adequate reserve is established. 
Some risk contracts provide that when gathering and trans- 
portation facilities are lacking, a contractor may, in some in- 
stances, commercially market (and export) the gas produced and 
pay YPF 25% of the price the contractor would have received if 
the gas had been delivered to the state.150 Underlying these nu- 
ances for Law 21,778 natural gas disposition is the same basic 
Law 21,778 standard-satisfaction of domestic demand and an 
adequate supply of reserves-that applies to crudes.161 In sum- 
mary, the essence of the exportation right is that a producer's 
right to export revolves around the whims of the state and the 
achievement of national production goals. 
The private sector of the Argentine petroleum industry does 
present exploration and production opportunities for entities 
that possess sufficient technical and financial competence. This 
industry, however, is highly regulated by the state and should 
not be entered without a thorough investigation of the prevailing 
political and economic climates within the country. In addition, 
whenever legally possible the private company must insist on in- 
telligent contractual safeguards anticipated to protect its inter- 
ests. In the private company's favor, and balanced against the 
state's desire to control its resources, is the fact that Argentina 
148. Law 17,319, supra note 11, at A-2, A-3 (art. 6); Memorandum of June 23, 1967, 
supra note 3, at B-11, B-12. 
149. Regulations, supra note 13, at 1, 23 (cls. 1, 16.2.3); see also Contract for the 
"Llancanelo" Area, supra note 13, at 36-37 (art. 11.3); Contract for the "Malargue Sur" 
Area, supra note 13, at 27-28 (art. 11.4). 
150. Contract for the "Comodoro Rivadavia Coastal Belt" Area, supra note 13, at 10 
(arts. 10.2.1, 10.2.3). 
151. Law 21,778, supra note 25, at 1 (art. 4); Regulations, supra note 13, at 1 (cl. 1); 
Memorandum of Apr. 14, 1978, supra note 13, at 13-14. 
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cannot rely on its state-owned companies to satisfy the country's 
petroleum production goals. As a consequence, Argentina has a 
definite need for private investment and participation in this vi- 
tal industry. 
The private operator looking at  potential involvement in 
Argentina's oil and gas industry has three avenues to consider: 
service contracts, risk contracts, or concession arrangements. 
This comment analyzed the latter two alternatives from an ex- 
ploration and production perspective. Both the risk contract and 
the concession agreement provide exploitation rights and, as re- 
quired, exploration rights tailored to meet a specific prospect's 
requirements. Both, however, come burdened with work and in- 
vestment commitments and fiscal regimes that require an opera- 
tor to accurately and continuously plan and evaluate his activi- 
ties. In all, the demands of keeping up with all of these 
commitments, combined with the economic and political insta- 
bility of Argentina, furnish the private operator with an interest- 
ing and challenging legal and business venture. 
Stephen L. Snow 
